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Abstract
The Amazon Kindle eBook reader supports a wide range of capabilities beyond
reading books. This functionality includes an inbuilt cellular data connection
known as Whispernet. The Kindle provides web browsing, an application
framework, eBook delivery and other services over this connection. The
historic data left by user interaction with this device may be of forensic
interest. Analysis of the Amazon Kindle device has resulted in a method to
reliably extract and interpret data from these devices in a forensically complete
manner.
Keywords: forensics, digital forensics, kindle, mobile, embedded, ebook,
ereader
1. INTRODUCTION
The Amazon Kindle eBook reader provides significant functionality aside from
that of simply reading eBooks. As the Kindle is an embedded computing
platform it is possible to deploy a wide range of functionality due to the use of
general computing hardware (see Table 1 for details). The Kindle platform has
grown to include a web browser, which utilizes an inbuilt cellular data
connection, an application framework, music player, image viewer, AGPS and
numerous other capabilities. The presence of this functionality leads to a
situation where the ability to provide forensic analysis of these devices would
be quite desirable due to the potential for nefarious use of such features.
Table 1 - Comparison of Kindle Hardware (Amazon, 2010)

Flash
Comms

Kindle
Freescale 532
MHz, ARM-11
256MB
Cellular/3G

Kindle Specifications
Kindle 2
Kindle DX
Freescale 532
Freescale 532
MHz, ARM-11
MHz, ARM-11
2GB
4GB
Cellular/3G
Cellular/3G

Kernel

Linux-2.6.26

Linux-2.6.26

CPU

Linux-2.6.26
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Kindle DX 2
Freescale 532
MHz, ARM-11
4GB
Cellular/3G +
WiFi
Linux-2.6.26

Kindle 3
Freescale 532
MHz, ARM-11
4GB
Cellular/3G
and/or WiFi
Linux-2.6.26
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The 2GB of flash storage is divided into four file systems (see figure 1), the
last of these is mapped to act as a USB mass storage device and is the only file
system that can be accessed, viewed or in any other way interacted with when
the kindle is in its secure state. The other three partitions contain the root Linux
file system, configuration files and a debug file system respectively.
$ fdisk kindle.img
Disk: kindle
geometry: 995/64/63 [4014080 sectors]
Signature: 0xAA55
Starting
Ending
#: id cyl hd sec - cyl hd sec [
start size]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------*1: 83
0
1
1 - 1023
3 16 [
16 819248] Linux files*
2: 83 1023
3 16 - 1023
3 16 [
819264 49152] Linux files*
3: 83 1023
3 16 - 1023
3 16 [
868416 16384] Linux files*
4: 0B 1023
3 16 - 1023
3 16 [
884800 3129280] Win95 FAT-32

Figure 1 - Partition Structure of the Kindle
Existing digital forensics software packages have implemented limited support
for Kindle devices, however there are is currently no support for examination
of the flash memory other than the FAT32 partition (MacForensicsLab, 2010).
In the same vein research has been performed by a number of individuals in an
attempt to derive forensic methodology for the Kindle, however this research
has also only focused on the FAT32 partition exposed as a USB mass storage
device (Huber, 2010b; Hughes, 2010; newinforensics, 2010).
2. SECURITY
The Kindle utilizes a firmware update mechanism that allows for over the air
(OTA) or manual updates. In the case of both the update file is placed in the
root of the mass storage portion of the file system. The update is then applied
once the user activates this functionality from the system menu of the device.
The update files themselves are essentially signed TAR archives, these are
extracted and a shell script contained within executed to facilitate the update
functionality. The signing mechanism relies on RSA encryption in which the
update is signed with amazon’s private key and verified with amazon’s public
key, which is pre-installed on the Kindle device (Hannay, 2010).
The security functionality can however be defeated as the tar archive is
extracted prior to signature verification. The most commonly employed exploit
to leverage this involves setting the absolute path to the public key store in the
tar archive, as such prior to signature validation a new public key is added to
the store. The result of this exploit is that the ability to sign arbitrary updates is
gained. The jailbreak process described here is illustrated below in Figure 2.
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New Public
Key
Start Kindle Update Mechanism
Insert with path to /var/uks/name.pub

Hostile TAR Archive

Sign Update

Unpack Tar Archive

Add to update

Hostile TAR
unpacks to

Update File

Check signature
against keystore

/var/uks/

Update Success &
Hostile Key Installed

Figure 2 - Illustration of Jailbreak Process
3. ACQUISITION METHODOLOGY
Prior to commencement of this section it is important to note that knowledge of
best practice in terms of hashing, evidence preservation and documentation are
assumed and as such are out of scope of this paper. The investigator should
ensure that he/she understands the impact that writing data to a device can have
and the implications on forensic integrity.
In order to accomplish the acquisition and analysis of the Kindle we must first
gain access to the device beyond what is available by default. This access is
achieved through use of the exploit identified in the previous section, the
implementation we will be using in this example is the Kindle Jailbreak (based
on AVNard’s earlier work), this utility includes a standard public/private key
pair which is known publicly as well as an installation framework (NiLuJe,
2010). At this stage in the process we now have the ability to install custom
software via the update system.
In order to gain complete access to the device it is necessary to install some
form of remote access software on the device. In our case a telnet & SSH
server will be installed along side scripts which allow for the USB port to be
remapped as a USB Ethernet Gadget. The package commonly used to achieve
this is the “USBNetwork” package, so named as it restores the USB
networking functionality that was originally present in early versions of the
Kindle firmware (NiLuJe, 2010). Once this has been accomplished it is
possible to establish to start the USBNetwork service by issuing the
“;debugOn” and “`usbNetwork” commands on the device (without quotes) as
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shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3 - The “;debugOn” command being issued
Once the USBNetworking package is installed and enabled it is possible to
start acquisition. This is accomplished through the use of telnet, dd and netcat,
this methodology has been commonly implemented in live system acquisitions
(Burdach, 2005). In this configuration the host system is configured to listen
for the data transmission, piping the output to dd. Then a telnet connection is
established to the kindle and data transfer initiated, this process is shown in
Figure 4 below.
1. Connect to kindle
$ telnet 192.168.2.2
Trying 192.168.2.2...
Connected to 192.168.2.2.
Escape character is '^]'.
[root@kindle root]#
2. Listen for connection on host sytem
$ nc -l 55555 | dd of=kindle.img
3185454+1385484 records in
4014080+0 records out
2055208960 bytes transferred in 915.234125 secs (2245555 bytes/sec)
3. Initiate transfer of data from kindle
[root@kindle /dev]# dd if=/dev/mmcblk0 | nc 192.168.2.1 55555
4014080+0 records in
4014080+0 records out

Figure 4 - Acquiring image of NAND memory
Once this acquisition is complete it may be desirable to split this file into the
four file systems that are contained within. The details of these can be extracted
using fdisk as shown in Figure 1. Once these partition boundaries are known
we can extract the individual partitions into their own files for subsequent
analysis as shown in Figure 5.
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$ dd if=kindle.img of=kindlep1.img skip=16 count=819248
819248+0 records in
819248+0 records out
419454976 bytes transferred in 23.742699 secs (17666693 bytes/sec)
$ dd if=kindle.img of=kindlep2.img skip=819264 count=49152
49152+0 records in
49152+0 records out
25165824 bytes transferred in 1.661936 secs (15142477 bytes/sec)
$ dd if=kindle.img of=kindlep3.img skip=868416 count=16384
16384+0 records in
16384+0 records out
8388608 bytes transferred in 0.315741 secs (26568018 bytes/sec)
$ dd if=kindle.img of=kindlep4.img skip=884800 count=3129280
3129280+0 records in
3129280+0 records out
1602191360 bytes transferred in 141.444850 secs (11327322 bytes/sec)

Figure 5 - Splitting disk image into individual partition images
The completion of this splitting leads us to the point where these images can be
analysed using traditional computer forensics methodologies. The next section
includes information on the various file systems and location of data that has
been deemed to be of forensic interest.
4. DATA OF INTEREST
Partition 1 (root file system)
Location
/opt/wan/firmware/mt3/version.dat
/opt/amazon/ebook/config/
/opt/amazon/ebook/prefs/
/etc/uks/

Description
Firmware version indicator
Configuration files
Preferences files
Public key store, keys other amazon’s and the key
created during jailbreak may indicate tampering
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Partition 2 (/var/local)
Location
/audio/
/eink/screen_saver_last
/java/prefs/cookies
/java/prefs/DevicePasswordData.pw
/java/prefs/browser/bookmarks
/java/prefs/browser/cookie.dat

/java/prefs/browser/settings
/java/prefs/com.amazon.ebook.bookl
et.reader/social-clipping/social-prefs

/java/prefs/com.amazon.ebook.frame
work
/java/prefs
/log/
/wan/

Description
Audio settings
The a reference to the last screen saver image
displayed
Cookies used to uniquely identify this device
to amazon. These are persistent.
Password data for this device
Web browser bookmarks
Web browser cookies (no cache is present,
this may provide limited historical evidence
of web access
Web browser configuration
Credentials and accounts associated with
social networking services (twitter, facebook,
etc) that have been set up for use with the
device
User settings including: country, timezone &
WAN status
Details of the user, kindle name & user name
Detailed logs of users interaction with the
device, including time stamps
Network configuration

Partition 4 (User file system – available via USB mass storage)

Location
/documents
/music
/system/Search Indexes/
/system/com.amazon.ebook.bo
oklet.reader/reader.pref

Description
Books and other publications for
consumption on device
Music and other audio for
consumption on device
History of each search conducted on
the device
Contains details of last book read,
font size selected and dictionary
currently in use.

Note: On all test systems partition 3 was zero filled. Based on investigation it
has been determined that this area is used for diagnostic purposes and likely
will not contain information outside of the development environment.
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5. CONCLUSION
eBook devices such as the Kindle are gathering increased interest from the
forensic community as they become increasingly popular. The included
cellular data capability of the Kindle specifically may make it a candidate for
nefarious purposes, as the there is no data cost associated with the global data
service (Hannay, 2010). In addition to data functionality the inclusion of an
application framework and development kit in beta release will only lead to
increased use of the product for purposes that were once met by the traditional
computing paradigm.
The initial efforts of the forensic community have focused on acquisition of
only a portion of the internal storage of the device as this area is readily
accessible as a USB mass storage device (Huber, 2010a, 2010b; Hughes, 2010;
MacForensicsLab, 2010; newinforensics, 2010). This paper has gone beyond
the existing methodologies and provided a mechanism for the acquisition of the
complete internal NAND memory and analysis of same. In order for this result
to be achieved however some data must be written to the device and in doing
so there is the possibility of data being overwritten. However aside from
invasive hardware based acquisition there are no current known techniques that
would allow for complete acquisition without this approach.
Research into small and embedded device forensics is ongoing, with increased
focus on complete acquisition of all relevant data from these systems,
including flash storage, memory and data stored on individual
microcontrollers.
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